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Editorial
What Level of Analysis is Most Salient for a
Global Theory of Corporate Governance?
By William Q. Judge
W e have five rigorous and relevant new comparativecorporate governance studies in this issue. Each of
these studies contributes to our journal’s overarching
mission of moving toward a rigorous and relevant theory of
corporate governance that can be meaningfully applied
throughout the world. In this editorial, I would like to focus
on the multiple levels of analysis involved with arriving at a
global theory.corg_841 97..98
As discussed in my previous editorial, the primary focus
of all corporate governance research is at the firm-level of
analysis. However, the antecedents and effects of corporate
governance operate at multiple levels of analysis. I will illus-
trate this assertion in my following discussion of the five
articles published in this general issue.
In our lead article, Liu and Magnan examine the joint
effect of national self-dealing regulations and the firm’s
ownership structure to predict firm value in 22 nations from
Asia and Western Europe. Building on agency theory, they
find that there is an interaction effect between national regu-
lations and the “ownership wedge” across these governance
environments. Their study refines and extends LaPorta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) study which
demonstrated a rather general impact of national regulations
on firm value. Specifically, this study demonstrates both a
national-level and firm-level impact on firm valuation.
In our second article, Grosvold and Brammer seek to
explore how national institutions may influence the propor-
tion of women on corporate boards within a nation. In their
comprehensive analysis of boards of directors operating in
38 nations from 2001–07, they reveal that national institu-
tions were systematically related to gender diversity. Fur-
thermore, they find that cultural and legal institutions are
the predominant institutional drivers. While they did not
explore firm- or industry-level antecedents, they did find
that national-level antecedents explained 40 to 60 per cent of
the variance in the proportion of women on corporate
boards.
Our third article is another multi-country study authored
by Du, Deloof and Jorrisen. This pioneering study fills a
rather large void in the international business and corporate
governance literatures by seeking to understand why some
boards for foreign subsidiaries are active, while others are
not. In this study, board involvement at the subsidiary level
was operationalized as the board being more active than
what the law requires in Belgium. Specifically, they studied
multi-national firms headquartered in 14 different nations
which operated foreign subsidiaries in Belgium. They found
that firm-level predictors, such the subsidiary’s strategic
mandate, prior performance, and size relative to the parent
firm to all be systematically related to subsidiary board
involvement. In addition, they found that the individual
CEO’s role back at headquarters, the cultural distance
between the two national cultures, and the overall national
governance system all influenced subsidiary board involve-
ment. This study has implications for both agency and
resource dependency perspectives on corporate governance.
Arora and Dharwadkar were the authors of our next
article. This empirical study seeks to better understand how
corporate governance is related to corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) outcomes. In terms of CSR outcomes, they dis-
tinguish between “positive” CSR (i.e., proactive stakeholder
management) and “negative” CSR (e.g., violation of societal
standards and regulations). They examine larger firms in the
United States during the period of 2001–05, and they employ
the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) to understand the
moderators of the corporate governance-corporate social
responsibility relationship. Interestingly, they find that
“effective” corporate governance constrains positive CSR
and it also reduces negative CSR. Furthermore, they also
note that firm slack and goal attainment discrepancies mod-
erate this relationship, as the BTOF predicts. Therefore, this
study reveals the unique role of firm-level antecedents to
influence socially-important outcomes within a single
nation.
Our final study by Lin, Yeh, and Li addresses the inabili-
ties of existing theories to predict the evolution of corporate
governance in rapidly changing industrial environments,
and proposes a contingency approach to fill the gap. Using
Taiwan’s high-technology industries as case studies, the
authors provide insights on how corporate governance
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changes among inter-organizational governance modes
depending on three contingency factors: technological
dependencies, capital availability and relative firm perfor-
mance. As such, this industry-level study focuses on the
stage of the product life cycle to make predictions on the
most efficient corporate governance mode within the value
chain for high-technology inter-organizational relationships.
While we still have much to learn before a global theory of
corporate governance emerges, this issue brings this
endeavor into sharper focus. First, these articles suggest that
there should be multiple levels of analysis in the global
theory and two of the levels should involve both national-
level factors as well as firm-level factors. It is still premature
to know whether industry-level factors should be explored
further, as Lin and associates suggest, but it is worth explor-
ing further. Second, universal theories, such as agency
theory, fail to consider national and industry context suffi-
ciently. Similarly, only considering national-level context, as
many institutional researchers do, is insufficient given sub-
stantial firm heterogeneity within a national context. Finally,
we need to learn much more about how governance bundles
(Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel & Jackson, 2008; Ward, Brown
& Rodriguez, 2009) work at multiple levels of analysis. For
example, do national-, industry- and firm-level governance
mechanisms complement or substitute for each other?
Of course, multiple levels of analysis may eventually show
that one level of analysis for the antecedents of corporate
governance is most parsimonious. As such, there is no
formal requirement that all levels be included in our global
theory. Furthermore, the field may settle on the ultimate
effect of corporate governance to be only at the firm-
or national-level. However, my reading of the literature
suggests that multiple-level “meso” studies of corporate
governance will prove to be most influential in future
research. Notably, other thoughtful researchers are coming
to the same conclusion (e.g., Brickson, 2005; Pitelis & Vasi-
laros, 2010; Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009). Please consider
submitting your research to our journal if you want to
engage in this simulating “conversation” on the antecedents
and effects of corporate governance throughout the global
economy.
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